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2Motives for investment in human capital of children: evidence
from Indonesian Family Life Survey Data
1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the motive for investment in human
capital of children by parents. The main difference between patterns of intergener-
ational transfers and investment in human capital of children in developed and most
of the developing countries is that while in all countries parents invest substantial
resources in the human capital of children, in less developed countries we observe
substantial resource transfers from children to parents but such transfers are much
less observed in developed countries. These patterns of transfers are sometimes
used to postulate the hypothesis that in less developed countries, parents’ invest-
ment in their children is more like lending to children since children cannot borrow
from the private capital market to ﬁnance their education, whereas in developed
countries, parents’ investment in their children is mainly due to parents’ altruism
towards their children.
In the literature on intergenerational transfers, there are mainly two strands re-
garding the motivation for such transfers: parental altruism and exchange. Becker
(1974) introduced a model of resource transfers from parents to children in which
parents are altruistic towards their children but children are not; transfers in his
model are motivated by parental altruism. A strong implication of his model is
that if parents transfer positive amount of resources to their children, publicly pro-
vided intergenerational transfers programs are neutralized in the sense that private
consumption decisions exact offset public transfers, in effect neutralizing them.
Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982) gave an alternative model of altruistic trans-
fers in which parents make transfers to children to offset their children’s earnings
inequality rather than for investment purpose. Empirical studies based on U.S.
data offer mixed evidence on altruistic transfers within the family. McGarry and
Schoeni (1995) found that parents give more to less well off children and elderly
3parents, suggesting that such transfers are not motivated by exchange motives.
In the extended family altruism models (Altonji et al (1992)), Hayashi (1995))
found that the distribution of resources within the family affects the distribution of
food consumption, rejecting the hypothesis that the extended family is altruistically
linked.
Among the alternative models of exchange motives for transfers, one set of
models view transfers of resources from parents to children as exchange of money
for non-market services received from their children. For instance, Bernheim,
Shleifer and Summers (1982) view bequest as strategic exchange for children’s
services such as visits. In another study, Cox and Ranks (1992) found that money
transfers are correlated with services received, and interpreted this as evidence of
exchange based quid-pro-quo in intra-family transfer behavior. Another variant of
exchange motive treats inter-vivo intergenerational transfers from parents to chil-
dren as forms of loans to help liquidity-constrained children early in the life cycle
in returns for children’s services in later periods. Cox (1987, 1990) found evidence
for such motivation.
The motive for parental investment in children’s education and its relationship
to old-age transfers from children to old parents have not drawn much attention
in the human capital literature. Among the few theoretical models of parental in-
vestment in children’s education, Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) extended the
Becker and Lewis (1978) quality-quantity model of parental human capital invest-
ment to an overlapping generations growth model in which human capital invest-
ment in children is motivated by parental altruism; such transfers, however, could
not be linked to transfers from children given that agents lived for one period. In
another overlapping generations growth model (Raut (1990)), parental investment
in their children’s human capital is motivated by the rate of transfers that they an-
ticipate receiving from children during old-age; however, the rate of transfers that
the children make to their old parents is determined outside the model by social
norm or other mechanisms. The literature on the empirical testing of the motive
for parental investment in their children’s human capital and its relationship to the
4transfers from children during parents’ old-age is as sparse as the theoretical lit-
erature. Lillard and Willis (1996) found evidence for the hypothesis that transfers
from parents to children for their education are paid back in parents’ old age, thus
ensuring parents’ old age security.
In this paper, we will examine the motive underlying intergenerational transfers
theoretically and then empirically using the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS)
data set. In section 2, we consider two models of parental human capital investment
and transfers from children during parent’s old-age. In both models, two-sided
altruism plays a signiﬁcant role. In the ﬁrst model, parents act as principal and
children as agent; parents determine the terms of schooling loans to their children
including how much their children should give back during the parent’s old-age.
Children are passive, but they are not worse-off with the terms of the loan. This
approach presumes that there are some family or social norms that enforce such
inter-generational contract. Our second model of transfers is based on reciprocity
in the sense that it gives autonomy to each agent regarding how much they like
to transfer to the other (not based on coercion as in the pure loan model). The
amount of parental human capital investment during children’s young age and the
amount that children transfer to their old parents during the children’s adult age,
are both determined simultaneously in Nash equilibrium. We then derive testable
restrictions and study the nature of optimal parental human capital investment in
their children and old-age transfers from their children when they grow up. The
testable restrictions allow us to test which model is consistent with the data that we
use. After describing the data and variables of our study in section 3, we carry out
the econometric testing and report other empirical results in section 4. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Basic Model
We provide two simpliﬁed models of parental investment in their children’s edu-
cation and old-age transfers that they may receive later from their adult children.
5The main distinguishing feature of these two models is that in one model, parental
educational investment and the old-age transfers from children are an implicit pure
loan contract, the terms of which are designed by parents, and children are pas-
sive in the setting of the terms; this is modeled in a principal-agent framework; in
the second model, while parents decide how much to invest in children’s human
capital, they cannot force children to transfer what parents deem reasonable; chil-
dren voluntarily decide the amount to be transferred to their old parents. Parents
anticipate children’s reciprocity and accordingly, decide the amount of human cap-
ital investment for their children. This will be analyzed in the Nash equilibrium
framework. We now describe these models.
We consider the following overlapping generations set-up. While in family
decisions, husband and wife may have different opinions, we will assume them
to be identical for our purpose, and formulate family decisions problems for a
representative parent; we treat the representative household head to be female for
expositional ease. Assume that our female household head is now adult, she has
a given number of children who will be adults in the next period and make family
decisions in the next period. We assume again that her children make identical de-
cisions, and we will refer to the representative child as the son for our expositional
ease.
The mother lives for two periods: adulthood (period 1) and old-age (period 2);
she earns incomes Ep1 and Ep2 respectively in period 1 and period 2. Let T1 be the
amount of human capital investment the mother makes on each of her n identical
children in period 1. Human capital investment here means only schooling invest-
ment. Let T2 be the amount of resource transfers she receives from each child in
period 2. When she is adult, her child is young, he goes to school, the amount of
schooling depends on how much he can spend on his education. Let us assume that
he invests whatever amount his parent gives him for education and he consumes all
of his endowment Ek1. In period 2, he is adult, and his earnings Ek2 depends on
the amount of schooling investment, T1 and his innate ability or talent level τ, we
denote this dependence by Ek2(T1,τ). Let us denote by cit, the consumption of
6agent i in period t, i = p,k and t = 1,2. We assume that the parent cares about her
child’s well-being and the child cares for his parent’s well-being. We incorporate
these two sided altruism by assuming the following utility functions:
parent’s utility function: u(cp1) + β U (cp2,vp (ck2)) (1)





vp represents the parent’s perception of her child’s utility from his consumption
ck2, in period 2, similarly uk represents the child’s perception of the parent’s utility
when the parent consumes cp2 in her old-age. Our notational convention is that the
felicity index represented by the lower or upper U refers to parent and the lower or
upper V refers to child.
The felicity index U in the parent’s utility function may depend on the number
of children, n; similarly how much children care about their parents as represented
in the son’s utility function V, may also depend on how many siblings, n, he has;
we take n to be a parameter of U, and V ; we explicitly recognize its presence when
we use a speciﬁc utility function and derive the econometric speciﬁcations. Let us
assume for now that parents are not liquidity constrained but their young children
in period 1 are.
Let us denote by s the amount of assets (ﬁnancial and physical) that the mother
decides to save for old-age. The budget constraints of the mother are:
cp1 + nT1 + s = Ep1 (3)
cp2 = (1 + r)s + nT2 + Ep2
When the saving s is unrestricted in sign, which is equivalent to assuming that
the parent faces perfect capital markets and is not liquidity constrained, the above
two constraints collapse into the usual inter-temporal budget constraint:









−nT1 ≡ Y(T1,T2) say
(4)
7The above budget constraint of the parent reﬂects the fact that the parent is not
liquidity constrained.
A child’s budget constraint is: ck2 = Ek2(T1,τ) − T2 (5)
We present our ﬁrst model in the next subsection.
2.1 Parental educational expenditures and old-age transfers as pure
loan
Under this scenario, we assume that the parent is the principal and the child is the
agent. The parent decides s,T1 and T2:
max
T1,T2≥0,s
u(cp1) + βU (cp2,vp (ck2))
subject to the budget constraints Eqs. (3)-(5), and the following participation con-
straint of her son:
V
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p2 denotes the amount of consumption that the parent would optimally
choose for her second period consumption if she did not transfer any amount of
educational loan to her child.
The above constraint (6) means that the parent decides her educational loan
contract (T1,T2) for her son in such a way that the educational loan contract is
acceptable to him.
There are a few notable features to this model of transfers:
• The educational loan contract (T1,T2) should be thought of as an implicit
contract. There is nothing in the model that tells us if her son is going to
honor the contract, when the time comes for him to pay T2. However, there
are several ways in which this contract is enforced, such as by social norms,
or through the reputation effect which comes into effect when it will be his
turn to receive transfers from his own children. But we do not address these
issues in this paper.
8• In this simpliﬁed version of the principal agent framework, the child has
no choice but to go through the schooling even though it may not improve
his utility compared to the utility level that he can attain by not going to
school (i.e., if the constraint (6) is binding). However, since the parent’s
utility depends on the child’s utility, it is possible that the constraint (6) is
not binding, or that T1 − T2/(1 + r) > 0, in which case the parent gets a
lower rate of return from investment in her children’s education as compared
to investment in capital markets. In this case, each child would have higher
schooling level than the level that he would obtain if he was able to borrow
from the capital market at the competitive interest rate r.
We assume that the participation constraint Eq. (6) is not binding. Later we
come back to its signiﬁcance and justiﬁcation. The ﬁrst order conditions with
respect to cp1 and cp2, after some rearrangements, or equivalently with respect to

































Eqs. (8) and (9) imply






Substituting Eq. (7) in the above, we have
∂Ek2(T1,τ)
∂T1
= 1 + r (10)
Eq. (10) alone determines the amount that the parent will invest in each of her
child’s education. Eq. (10) tells us that the parent will invest in each of her child’s
9education up to the point when the marginal increase in the earnings of the child
for one more dollar equals the market interest rate. From Eq. (10) it is clear that
the amount of investment depends on two factors, the market interest rate, and the
unobserved ability parameter of the child. The higher is the market interest rate or
the higher is the talent level of the child, the higher will be the investment in his
schooling. Furthermore, notice that the amount of investment in each of her child’s
education does not depend on the number of children she has. This is of course
what we expect if parents treat investment in schooling of children as a loan.
An implication of Eq. (10) is that if parents are not liquidity constrained (or
capital markets are perfect for parents but children are not allowed to borrow from
the capital market to ﬁnance their human capital investment), the level of school-
ing or parental investment on education of children T1 will depend only on the
market interest rate, and the ability of the child and nothing else. However, in less
developed countries, generally even parents are liquidity constrained, and poorer
mothers may have higher cost of raising money to invest on their children’s edu-
cation. Thus, variables measuring the mother’s socio-economic background and
ease of borrowing such as mother’s wage income, Ep1, level of her human capital,
and her asset holdings will signiﬁcantly affect T1. Representing these family back-
ground variables by Z, and the unobserved ability of her child and all other factors
that affect her decision T1 by 1 we specify the following regression equation:
lnT1 = β0 + β1Z + 1 (11)
After estimating this equation, if we ﬁnd excess sensitivity of the parameter
estimates of the regressors inZ,, we conclude that parents are liquidity constrained.
It is not possible to get an explicit solution for T2 in general. We use the
following speciﬁcation of the utility function to derive optimal T2:
U (cp2,vp (ck2)) = u(cp2) + γpvp (ck2) ... (A1)
vp (ck2) = u(ck2) ... (A2)
u(c) = αlnc. ... (A3)
(12)
We further assume that α+αβ+αβγp = 1, and 0 < α,β, and γp ≥ 0. We also
10assume that γp is an increasing function of n, the number of her children. When
γp = 0, parents are not altruistic towards their children. The assumption (A1)
means that U is separable, the assumption (A2) means that the mother values her
son’s consumption in her own way, and the assumption (A3) speciﬁes the utility
function to be Cobb-Douglas.
We maintain the assumption that parents are not liquidity constrained. Under







FromtheCobb-Douglasutilityfunction, weknowthatcp2 = αβ(1+r)Y(T1,T2);
substituting this, and the expression for ck2 from Eq. (5 ) in Eq. (13), and after
























The  term in the above speciﬁcation represents errors due to the approxima-
tion of utility functions, and variation in the taste parameters, and assuming that
 is random across children and households, we then have the following censored
regression model1 for the optimal transfers:
if 2 > −[α1Ek2 + α2T1 + α3Ep1 + α4Ep2], (15)
T2 = α1Ek2 + α2T1 + α3Ep1 + α4Ep2 +  2
T2 = 0 otherwise
Econometric implication and testing of the altruism hypothesis are as follows:
If we ﬁnd α3 and α4 to be negative, this will imply that parents are altruistic to-
wards children and T2 will be smaller for more well-off parents.
1There are many empirical studies which apply ordinary least squares estimation procedure to a
variant of the above equation. But it is well-known that such estimates are biased and inconsistent
and thus may lead to wrong inference. We will see such sensitive inference when we present our
empirical results.
11As mentioned earlier, γp may be an increasing function of the number of chil-
dren the mother has. In that case, we would expect that mothers with larger num-
ber of children will receive lower transfer from each child, given all other variables
constant. We will check this in our empirical investigation, by including the num-
ber of adult siblings in the above transfer equation of her son.
These results are derived under the assumption that the participation constraint
is not binding. Whether or not it is binding depends on the degree of children’s
altruism towards parents. For instance, suppose that parents care very little for
their children, and children care very little for their parents, then an optimal T2
above might turn out to yield lower utility for children than the reservation utility
that they could obtain without any educational investment from their parents. In
that case, the participation constraint will provide an upper limit T∗
2 and the above
regression equation will be censored from above as well. We, however, presume
that parents care for their children so much so that her choice of (T1,T2) will give
hersonhigherthanhisreservationutilitylevel. Weassumethiswithoutstatistically
testing its validity. Under this assumption, the mother would never ﬁnd an optimal
T2 which goes beyond this upper limit.
In this model, children are passive and to some extent powerless in the deter-
mination of the transfers levels. To see this, suppose that children care about their
parent’s old age consumption very much, and would like to transfer more than the
above, but that higher transfer will not be acceptable to parents, and it will result in
a war of back and forth inter-vivo transfers between parents and children. We will
not get into these theoretical issues here and assume away these possibilities.
Notice that since parents make their transfer decisions prior to their children’s
transfer decisions, a Stackleberg framework with subgame perfect equilibrium to
characterize behaviors may seem more appropriate. More speciﬁcally, investment
in children’s schooling decisions are ﬁrst made by parents leaving the decision
T2 to be made by children later; children’s transfers decision, T2 will vary with
(or to use a game theoretic term, react to) parents’ decision T1, and the old-age
income of the parents, (1 + r)s + Ep2; this kind of responses from children are
12known as reaction functions. While parents cannot directly tell their children how
much to transfer to them, they can manipulate the situation by, say, investing a
large part of their income on their children’s human capital and thus left with little
income in old-age, and children will then transfer more to them. For more details
on this, see Raut (1997). We do not consider these kinds of manipulated reciprocity
in children’s transfers in this paper, we leave these for empirical investigation to
another occasion.
Notice that the implicit contracts (T1,T2) in the pure loan framework are en-
forced by some mechanism in the family (either with social norm or by some other
mechanism) but the model itself cannot tell us anything about the mechanism itself.
It is possible that children do care for parents’ old-age consumption or well-being,
and thus the old-age transfers that the parents are observed to receive from their
children may be the result of their children’s voluntary decisions. We model this in
the next subsection.
2.2 Parental educational expenditures and old-age transfers as reci-
procity with two-sided altruism
In the previous model we assumed that the mother decides the amount of old-
age transfer that she deems reasonable, and children did not have anything to say.
We now consider a model of parental human capital investment, where the mother
decides how much to invest on her children, but it is up to her children to determine
how much they like to transfer to their parents during parents’ old-age. We model
this as a Nash equilibrium 2 as follows:




u(cp1) + βU (cp2,vp (ck2))
The budget constraints are as before, i.e., Eqs. (4) and (5).
2For a similar model based on two-sided altruism, and for a discussion of problems associated
with various equilibrium concepts, see Raut (1997) and Nerlove and Raut (1997, section 3.5).
13Her representative son takes his mother’s decisions s, and T1 ≥ 0 as given and








subject to the budget constraints Eq. (5) and the second line of Eq. (3) . The
ﬁrst order conditions with respect to s and T1 for the mother’s problem are exactly
same as Eqs. (7) and (8) in the previous model. However, in place of Eq. (9) of the










Unlike the previous model, we do not get a closed form solution for T1 in gen-
eral. We make the following assumptions that U and V are separable (B1 and B2
below) and that the actual felicity index of consumption of an agent coincides with
the perceived felicity index of another agent who is affected by this consumption
(B3 and B4 below). More speciﬁcally, we assume that





= v (ck2) + γkuk (cp2) ... (B2)
uk (cp2) = u(cp2) ... (B3)
vp (ck2) = v (ck2) ... (B4)
(17)








∂cp2. Substituting these in Eq. ( 16) we have
dvp
dck2




∂vp = γp, and substituting the above in Eqs. (7) and (8), we ﬁnd





14Unlike the previous model, we note that the optimal schooling investment level T1
may depend on the degree of two-sided altruism. The interesting feature is that if
one of the two altruism parameters is zero, the mother does not invest in her son’s
schooling. However, if γk is decreasing and γp is increasing in n, then although we
cannot assert whether the γk.γp is increasing or decreasing in n, but we can check
if the level of investment T1 depends at all on n. Apart from Z in our econometric
speciﬁcation of Eq. (11), we also include n. This provides a basis for a statistical
test to choose between two models: if the estimated coefﬁcient of n in Eq. (11)
turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant, we reject the pure loan model in favor of the
model of reciprocity described here.
Given s, T1, we can solve for T2 from Eq. (16) alone, which under the assump-

















[(1 + r)s + Ep2] + 2
T2 = 0, otherwise
(19)
where, 2 denotes the approximation errors as in the previous model.
Comparing Eqs. (14) and (19), we ﬁnd interesting properties of T2 under these
two models. While the transfer T2 under the pure loan model depends only on the
mother’s degree of altruism towards her son, in this reciprocity model, it depends
only on her son’s degree of altruism towards her. More importantly, notice that
while we can treat the square bracket term in the above to be more or less compa-
rable to the last square bracketed term in Eq. (14), we ﬁnd that Eq. (14) involves
an extra regressor: T1. The reason for this is quite simple, but it can help us to
statistically choose between two models of human capital investment and old-age
transfers. Under the pure loan model, given the parent’s income, and the son’s
income, the son must transfer higher T2 amount if T1 is higher, i.e., if his mother
lent him higher amount of human capital. Whereas in the model of this section,
after controlling for son’s earnings (which depends on T1), T1 has no independent
effect. We can use this to statistically test between two models.
153 The data
3.1 The IFLS
The Indonesian Family Life Survey is a multi-purpose household survey conducted
in1993byRandandLembagaDemograﬁ, theDemographicInstituteattheUniver-
sity of Indonesia. It was designed to study fertility behavior, infant and child health
outcomes, migration and employment patterns, and health and socio-economic
functioning of the older population. Its sample of around 7200 households is drawn
from 13 provinces out of a total of 27 provinces in Indonesia and covers around
83% of the country’s population.
The distinctive feature of the household survey is that it contains extensive
information not only on household demographic characteristics, health, and life
events, it also contains extensive information on economic activities of the house-
holds such as food and certain non-food expenditures, and household production
activities and assets holdings. Selected household members were asked about their
current and retrospective wages and employment patterns, marriage and pregnancy
history, migration history, health conditions and usage of health facilities, and
transferactivitiestowardnonresidentparents, childrenandsiblings. ACommunity
Facility Survey of availability and quality of infrastructure, health and school fa-
cilities used by household respondents is conducted in parallel with the household
survey and can thus be directly linked to the household questionnaire.
The household survey sample was stratiﬁed on provinces and randomly se-
lected within provinces. The sample frame used by the IFLS was based on the
one used by the 1993 SUSENAS, a socioeconomic survey of 60,000 households
conducted by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics. In the smaller provinces,
urban households were oversampled to facilitate rural-urban and Javanese-non Ja-
vanese comparisons. The questionnaire designed was modeled after the Malaysian
Family Life Surveys, the Indonesian Resources Mobilization Study and the In-
donesian Demographic and Health Surveys. Three sections of the questionnaire
collected information at the household level, and the remaining three at the indi-
16vidual level from adult respondents, ever married women and, by proxy, young
children.
Within the household, detailed information is collected on the household head
and the head’s spouse, two randomly selected children of the head and spouse aged
less than 14, a ”senior” member of the household aged 50 or more and his/her
spouse randomly selected from the remaining members, and for a randomly se-
lected 25% of the households, an individual of age 15 to 49 and his/her spouse are
selected from remaining members. Thus information is most complete for house-
hold heads and their spouses, and for the purpose of this paper, we will focus on
transfer activities of the head and head’s spouse only.
We now present summary statistics for the households that we are studying in
this paper.
3.2 Characteristics of respondent households
We are primarily interested in the head and the head’s spouse and their transfers
to their parents. Hence, the summary statistics are only presented for the respon-
dent’s households and their non coresident parents. We present these summary
statistics in tables 1 and 2. As indicated by table 1, the average annual household
total incomes is 8,447,674 Rupiahs or around US$4,048. A large part of total av-
erage household incomes is due to wage incomes which amounted to 8,100,147
Rupiahs, with the remaining part of household incomes coming from farm and non
farm businesses. However, as table 1 indicates, a relatively large proportion of
households, 38%, own a farm business, while only 27% of households own a non
farm business.
Theearningsdatawerecollectedonlyforthosehouseholdmemberswhoworked
outside their own farm or business. In order to impute earnings for these house-
hold members we assume that the production function for their farm and non-farm
business is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., per worker farm and non-farm business income is
given by y = f(k) = kσ, 0 < σ < 1, where k is the capital per worker. We take
earnings of a worker to be the marginal product of labor, i.e., w = (1 − σ)f(k).
17Most studies found σ to be around 1/3. Under these assumptions, we computed the
earnings of an individual working in his/her own farm or business as 2/3 times the
household non-wage income per worker. We tried other values of σ around 1/3,
the qualitative results did not change. We denote the earnings variable by INC EQ
in what follows.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Income and Assets
Variable Label N Mean
HHEMPINC total hh incomes from employment 7220 8100146.85
HHFASV household total farm asset values 7180 2324845.89
HHNFASV household total non farm asset values 7180 1167245.10
OWN BUSS Owns a non farm business 7220 0.27
OWN FARM Owns a farm 7220 0.381
OWN HSE Owns a house 7220 0.098
TFINC household total farm income (operating+rental 7180 129139.89
TNFINC total non farm incomes (operating+rental 7180 174072.70
TOT INC Total household incomes 7180 8447674.46
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of variables
Variable Description N Mean Std Dev
AGE Age of person 33032 26.273 19.435
FEMALE Female gender or not 33106 0.513 0.500
GRADE Number of schooling years 32888 4.687 4.447
INC EQ Average adult hh member earnings 21456 2826948.300 28023034.310
PAGE Parent’s age 19993 61.864 14.164
PGEN DUM Parent’s gender dummy 27391 0.474 0.499
PGRADE Parent’s educational level 18852 2.248 3.823
TF2P Money transfer to parent 3221 241339.030 2110593.400
MTFRP Money transfer from parents 1197 196519.630 1249310.580
POWN BU Parent’s business ownership (Yes or no) 10346 0.177 0.382
POWN HS Parent’s house ownership (Yes or no) 10390 0.893 0.309
POWN FR Parent’s farm ownership (Yes or no) 10348 0.554 0.497
PWORKN Parent’s working status (Yes or no) 27391 0.193 0.394
Table 2 shows individual characteristics of household members. The average
18age of the population in the sample of respondents interviewed is 26 years with
an average number of schooling of 4.7 years. Compared to the older generations
parents of the respondents, the current generation has attained higher levels of edu-
cation. There are slightly more women living in the households interviewed in the
survey, at 51% of the sample population as compared to 49% of the population be-
ing male. The average income of an adult household member stands at 2,826,948
Rupiahs or around US$1,355.
3.3 Characteristics of respondents’ parents
As indicated by table 2, on average, the non coresident parent is 62 years of age
with 47% of the non coresident parents being female, as compared to the current
generation population at 51% being female. The older generation has an average
of 2.25 years of schooling , less than the current generation which has an average
of 4.69 years of schooling. Slightly more than half, 55% of the older generation
had a farm business and 17% of them owning a non farm business. This reﬂects
a rapid trend in commercialization of the household economy away from farming.
Only 20% of the non coresident parents report to be still working.
The average money transfer given to parents amounted to 241,339 Rupiahs or
around US$116, which is more than the average transfer from parents, amounted to
196,520 Rupiahs or around US$94. In addition, the frequency of upward transfers
(from respondents to parents) is almost 3 times that of downward transfers (from
respondents to their children).
We will now turn to the empirical ﬁndings from our econometric analysis.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Earnings function and returns to education
We estimated an earnings function similar to Mincer’s (1974) earnings function.
The speciﬁcation in column (a) is exactly the same as Mincer’s original speciﬁ-
cation and our parameter estimates are interestingly almost identical to those of
19Mincer (see Willis (1986) for a concise presentation of Mincer’s estimates). The
estimates in column (a) of table 3 show that average of log-earnings of an adult
(LINC EQ) is highly correlated with own educational attainment (GRADE). The
return to education as measured by the increase in incomes from an additional
school year is 9.4%, controlling for asset ownership (OWN HSE, OWN BUSS,
OWN FARM), gender (FEMALE), and age.















































Number of obs. 21,165 21,165
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
The life cycle effect, as seen through the effect of the age variable, has the pre-
dicted effect: earnings rise ﬁrst with age to a certain point after which it declines.
The gender effect on incomes is, surprisingly, positive and signiﬁcant. We do not
haveanexplanationforthisﬁnding, butthisdeservesfurtheranalysisatalaterdate.
20Column (b) in table 3 shows very similar ﬁndings, with the additional result that
the return to education is an increasing function of own educational level squared,
GRADE2.
4.2 Parental investment in children’s education, T1
Direct school expenditures incurred by parents would have been the appropriate
measure of educational transfers but they were not recorded consistently in the
survey, and hence we use the educational attainment of children (CGRADE) as a
measure of T1, the parental investments in children’s education. The estimates are
as follows:
CGRADE = -0.610 −0.571 * GRADE −0.887 * CGEND
(0.96) (28.06) (6.58)




The above estimates show that children’s educational attainment is positively
correlatedwiththeirparents’educationalattainment(GRADE)andincomes(LN Y).
The direct effect of income is evidence of the existence of liquidity constraints
and their effect on educational investments in children, once the parent’s educa-
tion level has been controlled for. Notice that the effect of the dummy variable
CGEND (which is 1 if female and 0 otherwise) is signiﬁcantly negative, i.e., fe-
male children’s educational attainment is signiﬁcantly less than that of their male
counterparts but by only less than one school year.
Notice that the greater the number of children (NO CHILD), the higher is the
educational level of children. Eq. 18 suggests that the effect of this variable can be
positive or negative, due to γ varying according to the number of children. Since
the effect of NO CHLD is statistically highly signiﬁcant, our test between two
models, once again, rejects the pure loan motive in favor of the two-sided altruistic
motive for parental investment in children’s education, and children’s transfer of
resources to their old-parents.
214.3 Transfers from children to parents
We estimated variants of T2 in Eq. (19) using ordinary least squares procedure and
censored regression techniques (i.e., Tobit regression) as suggested by our theo-
retical model. In one variant, we use lnT2, and in the other one, we use T2. The
ordinary least square estimates of the above two variants are shown in the ﬁrst
two columns, and the estimates from Tobit analysis of only the second variant are
shown in the third column of table 4.
Fromtheﬁrstcolumnintable4, theﬁrstOLSequationoflogtransfertoparents
shows that the higher the education level of the child (GRADE), after controlling
for children’s incomes (LN Y), the higher the transfer amount to parents. This
result has been interpreted as evidence for the loan repayment hypothesis (Lillard
and Willis (1996)). However, as we will show, this result is sensitive to the spec-
iﬁcation of the equation to be tested. The negative coefﬁcient of parents income
is consistent with either reciprocity with two-sided altruism or the pure loan re-
payment model. House ownership by parents (POWN HSE) raises transfers from
children, while farm ownership by parents (POWN FR) reduces such transfers.
Female children transfer less to their parents than male children. The higher the
parents’ age (PAGE), the higher the transfer amount, as it is expected that the older
the parents, the more assistance they may need. The higher the educational level
of parents (PGRADE), the higher the transfer amount; this result could be due to
the effect of the parent’s high permanent income on previous period educational
investments.
In the actual transfer OLS equation in second column in table 4, the effect of
respondent children’s educational level (GRADE) becomes insigniﬁcant, as well
as the effect of other variables.
In the Tobit equation in the third column in table 4, all variables which were
signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst column of table 4, retain their signiﬁcance except for house
ownership by parents (POWN HS) and educational level of respondent children
(GRADE). The fact that GRADE is no longer signiﬁcant together with the fact that
parents’ estimated incomes (PLN Y) retains its negative coefﬁcient lend support,
22Table 4: Transfers to old parents, T2




























































































R2 0.065 0.0036 λ=
1152.840
(57.640)
Number of obs. 5,581 5,581 5,581
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis.
23once again, to the reciprocity with two-sided altruism model of parental educa-
tional investment and children’s old-age support against the pure loan model.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered two models of parental investment in children’s
human capital and transfers of resources from children to parents when they grow
older. The ﬁrst model treats parental investment in children’s education as a type
of loan and the terms of repayment are decided by parents. While two sided al-
truism plays some role in the determination of the implicit loan contract, but it is
not the driving force in the determination of such transfers. In the second model,
parents decide how much they like to invest in their children, and children decide
how much they like to pay back when they grow-up. Here the two-way transfers
are determined by reciprocity with two-sided altruism. We have derived testable
restrictions that can distinguish between two models, and we have also compared
the nature of these two transfers under the two models using the Indonesian Family
Life Survey Data. Our study favors the reciprocity with two-sided altruism model
over the pure loan model.
The ﬁndings that parents’ old age income is negatively correlated with respon-
dent children’s income, and that the child’s educational level is insigniﬁcant in the
estimated model of transfers from children to parent, lend support to the reciprocity
two-sided altruism model for these transfers, while casting doubt on the repayment
hypothesis.
In addition, we ﬁnd that the number of children is a signiﬁcant determinant
of the level of human capital investment that parents make for each child, which
lends additional support to the reciprocity two-sided altruism model, since this
variable does not matter for the education of a child under the pure loan model. As
generally expected, we also ﬁnd evidence that parents are liquidity constrained in
making human capital investment levels for their children. This suggests that there
is a role for public policy to improve efﬁciency in the allocation of human capital
24investments.
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